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1 Introduction 
The technological level of industry in a country is reflected in the structure of trade, and 
especially of exports. It is obvious that as the technological level of industry goes up, the 
technology intensity of exports also rises, and simultaneously more sophisticated 
products are exported from the country, so that its export structure may approach that 
of more advanced economies. 
The above relationship, however, becomes less straightforward when we consider the 
reverse causality; that is, whether a large proportion of high-technology exports is 
accompanied by strong technological capabilities. Deciding this has become increasingly 
difficult, as many developing countries are engaged in vertical fragmentation of 
production (Lall, 2000; Srholec, 2006). For example, if a highly export-oriented economy, 
such as China, acts as a part of production networks organized by multinational 
enterprises and is engaged in assembling high-technology products that heavily depend 
on imported inputs, the technology intensity of exports that is measured by trade 
statistics will be raised accordingly. But does this increased statistic reflect an actual 
increase in the technological capabilities of the exporting country?  
In recent years, many studies have been conducted to estimate the technological 
intensity of China’s exports. The above observation, however, raises a serious concern 
about how best to measure technological intensity of exports. Trade statistics, which 
have been used to measure this, may not be appropriate in an environment of rapidly 
progressing vertical fragmentation.  
In this study, an alternative approach will be presented. Instead of export values, the 
domestic content of exports will be used as a measure of the technological intensity of 
exports. Note that, in estimating the domestic content of exports, value from foreign 
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content is removed from total export values, so that the value added by only domestic 
factors of production is captured by the measure. The Asian input–output (AIO) tables 
will be used to estimate the domestic content of exports. The AIO tables cover 
inter-industry transactions within nine East Asian economies and the United States; 
other economies are treated exogenously in aggregate as the “rest of the world” (ROW).1 
Value added exports is also used as an alternative measure of the technological 
intensity of exports. Value added exports indicate the flow of value added between the 
source and destination countries and are associated with trade flow. Such exports are 
conceptually distinct from the domestic content of exports: The relations among the 
three measures (gross exports, domestic content of exports, and value added exports) 
will be shown in a systematic manner with particular reference to the AIO tables. 
Indices of vertical specialization, originally developed by Hummels et al. (2001), will 
be applied to the AIO tables. These indices will provide valuable information on how 
various economies are involved in East Asian production networks and how they 
procure the intermediate inputs used to produce exports. 
This study focuses on the technological intensity of China’s exports, but it also 
examines inter-industry linkages with neighboring economies, such as Japan, South 
Korea, and Taiwan, which are major suppliers of intermediate inputs for China’s 
high-technology exports. Because Chinese industries, and particularly its 
high-technology industries, have forged a close and complementary relationship with 
neighboring countries, it is crucially important to examine the issue from a regional 
perspective. The study also compares the technology intensity of China’s exports with 
                                                   
1 The AIO tables cover China, Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia, and the United States. 
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those of neighboring countries. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews previous empirical works on the 
export structure of China. Section 3 presents the methods of analysis. Section 4 
discusses the obtained results. Section 5 provides a conclusion.  
          
2 Export structure of China 
In this section, we first look at major characteristics of China’s involvement in vertical 
production networks. After that, previous studies on the sophistication of China’s 
exports are discussed. 
 
2.1 Triangular trade structure  
China’s rapid economic growth is closely related to its involvement in East Asian 
production networks. For example, it is well-known that China emerged (at the expense 
of many Southeast Asian economies) as a final manufacturing assembler in East Asia 
after its accession to the WTO in 2001. China’s role is most aptly understood from a 
view of the triangular trade, whereby China imports intermediate inputs from 
neighboring East Asian economies, assembles them, and then exports final products to 
the US and EU markets (Kuroiwa and Kuwamori, 2011). A triangular trade structure is 
especially prominent in the electrical appliances and office and telecommunication 
equipment sectors (Haddad, 2007; Tong and Zheng, 2008).  
 
2.2 Sophistication of exports  
Another important characteristic of China is its rapid sophistication of the export 
structure. Sophistication of exports can be measured in a variety of ways. For example, 
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Rodrik (2006) and Hausmann et al. (2007) estimate the degree of export sophistication 
by using PRODY and EXPY. PRODY is a weighted sum of the per capita GDP of the 
countries exporting a given product and, therefore, represents the income level 
associated with each of these products; EXPY is the weighted sum of PRODY, where the 
weight is given by the share of each product in the country’s total exports. Therefore, 
EXPY represents the income level associated with the country’s overall export bundle. 
As a consequence, Rodrik (2006) shows that China has exported a wide range of highly 
sophisticated products, and its export bundle is similar to that of a country with a 
per-capita income three times higher than China’s (Rodrik, 2006). Moreover, an 
empirical study conducted by Jarreau and Poncet (2009) reveals that the sophistication 
of exports has positively influenced the export and growth performances of Chinese 
provinces. 
An alternative approach to measure export sophistication is to use a measure of 
export similarity developed by Finger and Kreinin (1979). The export similarity index 
(ESI) is defined by the formula, 𝐸𝐸𝐸tcd = ∑ min (p 𝐸tpc, 𝐸tpd), where 𝐸tpc is the share of 
country c’s exports in manufacturing product p during year t. The ESI is a bilateral 
measure that takes values between 0 and 1: 𝐸𝐸𝐸tcd= 0 if countries c and d have no 
products in common during year t and 𝐸𝐸𝐸tcd= 1 if their exports are distributed 
identically across products. Using the ESI, Schott (2006) examines the relative 
sophistication of China’s exports to the United States and shows that China’s export 
overlap with more developed countries (in that study, OECD countries) has increased 
dramatically over time, jumping from a rank of 21 among non-OECD U.S. trading 
partners in 1972 to a rank of 3 in 2001, just behind Mexico and South Korea and ahead 
of Taiwan.  
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2.3 Technological intensity of exports 
Another group of scholars, however, has criticized the rather optimistic conclusion 
regarding the upgrading of export composition in developing countries such as China. 
Lall (2000), for example, investigates the technology structure and performance of 
developing countries’ manufactured exports, and notes that a significant part of the 
high-technology industry growth in developing countries might be “something of a 
statistical illusion,” because the countries are specializing in labor-intensive processes 
within technology-intensive activities. Srholec (2007), in contrast, argues that 
specialization in high-technology exports can be a mere reflection of high-technology 
component imports: his econometric analysis reveals that although domestic 
technological capabilities are associated with export performance in electronics—which 
occupies a dominant share of high-technology exports in developing countries—it is the 
propensity to import electronics components that accounts for the largest portion of 
cross-country differences in specialization in electronics exports. In a similar vein, Amiti 
and Freund (2010) examine the skill content of manufacturing exports in China. They 
find that although there has been a significant increase in the skill content of China’s 
total manufacturing exports, it is mainly due to an increase in imported inputs used for 
processing trade. 
The above discussions reveal the necessity to separate the influences of imported 
inputs from those of domestic factor inputs. The next section introduces a method of 
input–output analysis that meets this requirement in a systematic and consistent 
manner. 
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3 Method of analysis 
In this section, a method of input–output analysis is presented for analyzing the 
technological structure of exports. First, gross exports are decomposed into several 
elements, with a focus on the relations among gross exports, value added exports, and 
domestic content of exports. Then, measures of the technological intensity of exports are 
introduced, with reference to the above three export measures. Finally, the indices of 
vertical specialization are presented.  
 
3.1 Decomposition of gross exports in the AIO tables 
Input–output analysis has been used often to estimate induced outputs for exogenously 
given final demand. In the analysis of domestic content of exports, induced domestic 
value added (rather than output) is estimated for a given level of exports. Recently, 
Koopman et al. (2012) developed a method of decomposition of gross exports for the 
global inter-country input–output (ICIO) tables. This paper, in contrast, attempts to 
apply a similar method to input–output tables of a different format, the AIO tables. We 
note that a major difference between the global ICIO tables and the AIO tables lies in 
their treatments of the “imports from the ROW” matrices and the “exports to the ROW” 
vectors: these two trade-related transactions are treated endogenously in the ICIO 
tables and exogenously in the AIO tables.   
From the equality of demand and output supply in the AIO tables, it holds that 
 
𝑥𝑟 = 𝐴𝑟1𝑥1 + 𝐴𝑟2𝑥2 …𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑥𝑟 + 𝑓𝑟1 + 𝑓𝑟2 … + 𝑓𝑟𝑟 + 𝑟𝑟 for r = 1,2,…G  (1) 
 
where 𝑥𝑟 is country 𝑟’s 𝑛 × 1 vector of outputs (n and G are, respectively, the numbers 
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of industrial sectors and of endogenous countries in the AIO tables); 𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑥𝑟 is an 𝑛 × 1 
vector that indicates the flows of intermediate inputs provided by country 𝑟 to country 
𝑠 (𝐴𝑟𝑟  is an 𝑛 × 𝑛 input coefficient matrix) ; 𝑓𝑟𝑟  is an 𝑛 × 1 vector of final goods 
provided by country 𝑟 and consumed by country 𝑠; and 𝑟𝑟 is country 𝑟’s 𝑛 × 1 vector 
of exports to the ROW. Note that, different than the ICIO tables, the AIO tables cover 
transactions (both intermediate inputs and final goods) among only nine Asian 
countries and the United States (see footnote 1), so that Country 𝑟’s exports to other 
countries or regions are summed up and included in a single vector of exports to the 
ROW, 𝑟𝑟.  
Next, Eq. (1) can be rewritten in a matrix form as   
 
�
𝑥1
⋮
𝑥𝑟
� = �𝐴11 ⋯ 𝐴1𝑟⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐴𝑟1 ⋯ 𝐴𝑟𝑟
� �
𝑥1
⋮
𝑥𝑟
� + � 𝑓11 + 𝑓12 … + 𝑓1𝑟 + 𝑟1⋮
𝑓𝑟1 + 𝑓𝑟2 … + 𝑓𝑟𝑟 + 𝑟𝑟�. (2) 
 
Solving Equation (2) for 𝑥 yields  
 
�
𝑥1
⋮
𝑥𝑟
� = �𝐸 − 𝐴11 ⋯ −𝐴1𝑟⋮ ⋱ ⋮
−𝐴𝑟1 ⋯ 𝐸 − 𝐴𝑟𝑟
�
−1
�
𝑓11 + 𝑓12 … + 𝑓1𝑟 + 𝑟1
⋮
𝑓𝑟1 + 𝑓𝑟2 … + 𝑓𝑟𝑟 + 𝑟𝑟�  
= �𝐵11 ⋯ 𝐵1𝑟⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐵𝑟1 ⋯ 𝐵𝑟𝑟
� �
∑ 𝑓1𝑟𝑟𝑟=1 + 𝑟1
⋮
∑ 𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟=1 + 𝑟𝑟�, (3) 
 
where 𝐵𝑟𝑟 is an 𝑛 × 𝑛 submatrix of the Leontief inverse matrix. Then, the value added 
in country r  (i.e., 𝑣𝑣𝑟), which is induced by the final demand vector, is obtained by 
pre-multiplying Eq. (3) by a value added coefficient matrix. 
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�
𝑣𝑣1
⋮
𝑣𝑣𝑟
� = �𝑉�1 ⋯ 𝑂⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝑂 ⋯ 𝑉�𝑟
� �
𝐵11 ⋯ 𝐵1𝑟
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐵𝑟1 ⋯ 𝐵𝑟𝑟
� �
∑ 𝑓1𝑟𝑟𝑟=1 + 𝑟1
⋮
∑ 𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟=1 + 𝑟𝑟�  
=�
∑ 𝑉�1𝐵1𝑟(𝑟𝑟=1 ∑ 𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟=1 + 𝑟𝑟)
⋮
∑ 𝑉�𝑟𝐵𝑟𝑟(𝑟𝑟=1 ∑ 𝑓𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟=1 + 𝑟𝑟)�, (4) 
 
where 𝑉�𝑟 is country 𝑟’s 𝑛 × 𝑛 diagonal matrix of value added coefficients (value added 
coefficients are ratios of value added relative to total output). From Eq. (4), total value 
added exports from country s to country r can then be calculated as  
  
𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟 = 𝑢′ 𝑉� 𝑟 ∑ 𝐵𝑟𝑠𝑓𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑠=1   
= 𝑣𝑟′∑ 𝐵𝑟𝑠𝑓𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑠=1 , (5) 
 
where 𝑣𝑣𝑟𝑟represents the value added generated in source country s but absorbed (or 
consumed) as final products in destination country r, and 𝑢′ is a 1 x n row vector whose 
entries are all 1. Note that Eq. (5) is conceptually equivalent to the “value added exports” 
defined by Johnson and Noguera (2012). By summing over the destination countries, 
country s’s value added exports to the world are given by 
 
𝑣𝑣𝑟∗ = 𝑢′ 𝑉� 𝑟 ∑ 𝐵𝑟𝑠𝑟𝑠=1 (∑ 𝑓𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑟≠𝑟 + 𝑟𝑠)   
= 𝑣𝑟′ ∑ 𝐵𝑟𝑠𝑟𝑠=1 (∑ 𝑓𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑟≠𝑟 + 𝑟𝑠).  (6) 
 
Note that, unlike in the analysis in Koopman et al. (2012), Eq. (6) includes 𝑟𝑠, which 
indicates country g’s value added exports to the ROW.  
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From the relations among the value added coefficient matrix, the imports from the 
ROW matrix, and the Leontief inverse matrix, it holds that  
 
∑ 𝑢′(𝑉�𝑟𝑟𝑟=1 + 𝑀�𝑟)𝐵𝑟𝑟=∑ (𝑣𝑟𝑟𝑟=1 ′ + 𝑚𝑟′)𝐵𝑟𝑟=u',  (7) 2 
 
where 𝑀�𝑟 is an import coefficient matrix that indicates the flows of intermediate inputs 
provided by the ROW to country 𝑟. On the other hand, country s’s exports to the world 
by industrial sector can be calculated as    
 
𝑒𝑟∗ = ∑ 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟≠𝑟 = ∑ (𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟≠𝑟 𝑥𝑟 + 𝑓𝑟𝑟)  + 𝑟𝑟. (8) 
 
Note that 𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑥𝑟 and 𝑓𝑟𝑟respectively represent exports of intermediate inputs and final 
goods from country s to country r. Substituting Eq. (7) into Eq. (8), country s’s gross 
exports can be calculated as 
 
u′𝑒𝑟∗= ∑ (𝑣𝑟𝑟𝑟=1 ′ + 𝑚𝑟′)𝐵𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑟∗ 
= (𝑣𝑟′ + 𝑚𝑟′)𝐵𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑟∗+ ( 𝑣𝑟′ + 𝑚𝑟′)∑ 𝐵𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑟∗𝑟𝑟≠𝑟 . (9) 
 
Rearranging Eq. (6) and Eq. (8), the first term of Eq. (9) can be expressed as 
 
                                                   
2 Eq. (7) indicates how much value added and imports from the ROW are induced when 
one unit of final demand is given to all sectors in country s. In this case, since final 
demand (exogenously given) induces the same amount of either value added in 
endogenous countries or imports from the ROW, the sum of value added and imports 
from the ROW always equals one unit, seen directly in Eq. (7).   
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(𝑣𝑟′ + 𝑚𝑟′)𝐵𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑟∗ = 𝑣𝑣𝑟∗+𝑚𝑟′∑ 𝐵𝑟𝑠𝑟𝑠=1 (∑ 𝑓𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑟≠𝑟 + 𝑟𝑠) + (𝑣𝑟′ + 𝑚𝑟′)𝐵𝑟𝑟[∑ (𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟≠𝑟 𝑋𝑟 +𝑓𝑟𝑟) + 𝑟𝑟] − (𝑣𝑟′ + 𝑚𝑟′) ∑ 𝐵𝑟𝑠𝑟𝑠=1 (∑ 𝑓𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑟≠𝑟 + 𝑟𝑠). (10) 
 
Since 𝑥𝑟 = ∑ (𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟=1 𝑥𝑟 + 𝑓𝑟𝑟) +  𝑟𝑟  and simultaneously 𝑥𝑟 = ∑ 𝐵𝑟𝑠𝑟𝑠=1 (∑ 𝑓𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑟=1 + 𝑟𝑠) 
(see Eqs. (2) and (3)), the third and fourth terms of Eq. (10) can be rewritten as 
 
𝑧𝑟=(𝑣𝑟′ + 𝑚𝑟′)[𝐵𝑟𝑟(𝑥𝑟 − 𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑥𝑟−𝑓𝑟𝑟) − (𝑥𝑟 − ∑ 𝐵𝑟𝑠𝑟𝑠=1 𝑓𝑠𝑟)] 
= (𝑣𝑟′ + 𝑚𝑟′){[𝐵𝑟𝑟(𝐸 − 𝐴𝑟𝑟) − 𝐸]𝑥𝑟 + �∑ 𝐵𝑟𝑠𝑟𝑠=1 𝑓𝑠𝑟 − 𝐵𝑟𝑟𝑓𝑟𝑟�}. (11) 
 
Then, substituting 𝐵𝑟𝑟(𝐸 − 𝐴𝑟𝑟) − 𝐸 in Eq. (11) with ∑ 𝐵𝑟𝑟𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟≠𝑟 , 3 we get   
 
𝑧𝑟=(𝑣𝑟′ + 𝑚𝑟′)[∑ 𝐵𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟≠𝑟 (𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑥𝑟+𝑓𝑟𝑟)]. (12) 
 
Inserting Eq. (12) into Eq. (9) and Eq. (10) yields 
 
𝑢′𝑒𝑟∗= 𝑣𝑣𝑟∗+𝑚𝑟′∑ 𝐵𝑟𝑠𝑟𝑠=1 (∑ 𝑓𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑟≠𝑟 + 𝑟𝑠) +(𝑣𝑟′ + 𝑚𝑟′)[∑ 𝐵𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟≠𝑟 (𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑥𝑟+𝑓𝑟𝑟)] 
+(𝑣𝑟′ + 𝑚𝑟′)∑ 𝐵𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑟∗𝑟𝑟≠𝑟   
=𝑣𝑣𝑟∗+𝑣𝑟 ′(∑ 𝐵𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟≠𝑟 𝑒𝑟𝑟)+ 𝑣𝑟′∑ 𝐵𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑟∗𝑟𝑟≠𝑟  
+𝑚𝑟′∑ 𝐵𝑟𝑠𝑟𝑠=1 (∑ 𝑓𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑟≠𝑟 + 𝑟𝑠)+𝑚𝑟′(∑ 𝐵𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟≠𝑟 𝑒𝑟𝑟)+𝑚𝑟′∑ 𝐵𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑟∗𝑟𝑟≠𝑟  . (13) 
 
                                                   
3 From Eq. (3), it holds that   
 
�
𝐵11 ⋯ 𝐵1𝑟
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
𝐵𝑟1 ⋯ 𝐵𝑟𝑟
� �
𝐸 − 𝐴11 ⋯ −𝐴1𝑟
⋮ ⋱ ⋮
−𝐴𝑟1 ⋯ 𝐸 − 𝐴𝑟𝑟
�=�
𝐸 ⋯ 0
⋮ ⋱ ⋮0 ⋯ 𝐸�. 
 
Thus, we obtain 𝐵𝑟𝑟(𝐸 − 𝐴𝑟𝑟) − 𝐸 = ∑ 𝐵𝑟𝑟𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟≠𝑟 . 
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In Eq. (13), the gross exports of the source country s are now decomposed into four 
elements: (i) value added exports, which are produced in country s and absorbed outside 
the source country (=𝑣𝑣𝑟∗ = 𝑣𝑟′∑ 𝐵𝑟𝑠𝑟𝑠=1 (∑ 𝑓𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑟≠𝑟 + 𝑟𝑠) ), (ii) re-imports, which are 
initially exported (as intermediate inputs) but eventually returned and consumed in the 
source country (as intermediate inputs or as final products) (= 𝑣𝑟′ (∑ 𝐵𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟≠𝑟 𝑒𝑟𝑟)); (iii) 
Asian content4, which is generated in endogenous countries and embodied (as imported 
inputs) in the source country’s exports (=𝑣𝑟′∑ 𝐵𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑟∗𝑟𝑟≠𝑟 ); and (iv) imports from the ROW, 
which are induced by the source country’s exports (= 
𝑚𝑟′∑ 𝐵𝑟𝑠𝑟𝑠=1 (∑ 𝑓𝑠𝑟𝑟𝑟≠𝑟 + 𝑟𝑠)+𝑚𝑟′ (∑ 𝐵𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟≠𝑟 𝑒𝑟𝑟)+𝑚𝑟′∑ 𝐵𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑟∗𝑟𝑟≠𝑟 ).  
Eq. (13) corresponds to Eq. (34) of Koopman et al. (2012), but the former appears to be 
more complicated than the latter because it includes the terms relevant to (iv), imports 
from the ROW.5   
  
3.2 Measures of the technological intensity of exports   
As discussed in the previous section, the decomposition of gross exports demonstrates 
the following relation: 
 
Gross exports= (i) value added exports + (ii) re-imports + (iii) Asian content 
 + (iv) imports from the ROW.    (14) 
 
In Eq. (14), both components (iii) and (iv) represent value added that is generated 
                                                   
4 Instead of “foreign content”, the term “Asian content” will be used hereafter to clarify 
the difference between the ICIO and AIO tables.      
5 It is shown that gross exports are finally decomposed into nine elements in Koopman 
et al. (2012). In our method of decomposition, using the AIO tables, gross exports can be 
decomposed into a greater number of elements because of the terms relevant to the 
import from the ROW and exports to the ROW.   
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outside the exporting country. Thus, they should be separated from export values in 
examining the technology intensity of exports: note that only the value added that is 
generated by domestic factors of production should be included in such a measure.  
In this regard, (i) should be included in the measure, because it represents the value 
added embodied in the exports and indirectly exported to the other countries. 
Re-imports, component (ii), are more nuanced. The re-imports contain the value added 
content that is initially exported but eventually returned and consumed in the 
exporting country. Therefore, its value added content is not actually exported (if we 
follow the definition of value added exports from Eq. (5)), although it is still a part of the 
domestic value added content that is induced by trade linkages. Thus, if we include the 
re-imports as a part of the domestic content (DC) of exports, DC contains both (i) the 
value added exports and (ii) the re-imports6.    
Originally, the technological intensity of exports was measured by the share of 
high-technology industry in exports (Lall, 2000). Now, there are two additional 
measures: one is the share of high-technology industry in value added exports, and the 
other is the share in domestic content (DC) of exports. 7 These measures will be 
                                                   
6 The above treatment is in line with previous empirical studies on the Heckscher–
Ohlin model. Since Leontief (1953) used a single country input–output table to measure 
the factor content of US trade, many studies have been conducted to test the 
Heckscher–Ohlin theorem with the use of input–output tables. In recent years, Trefler 
and Zhu (2010) used an international input–output table to estimate the 
Vanek-consistent factor content of trade. These studies focus on the factor content of 
trade, such as labor and capital inputs embodied in trade, because international trade is 
viewed as an indirect or disguised means of trading factor inputs embodied in trade. 
Meanwhile, the analysis of value added trade investigates the value added content 
(which is equivalent to factor inputs times factor prices) contained in trade.    
7 It is shown by Koopman et al. (2012) that a pure double-counted portion is included in 
the intermediate transactions of the re-imports. Thus, the domestic value added that is 
actually induced by exports (DV) is less than DC of exports. The author calculated the 
DVs for the countries covered in the AIO tables and found that the share of the pure 
double-counted portion is quite small (less than 0.5%), so that it does not significantly 
affect the export structure of the countries. Therefore, only the value added (VA) exports 
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employed to indicate the technological intensity of exports. 
 
3.3 The indices of vertical specialization  
The indices of vertical specialization are instrumental in demonstrating how a country 
is engaged in vertical production networks. There are two kinds of vertical 
specialization indices―VS and VS1― originally proposed by Hummels et al. (2001). The 
VS index indicates the foreign content of exports (equivalent to Asian content in the 
context of the AIO tables) and is given by  
  
𝑉𝐸𝑟= ∑ 𝑣𝑡𝐵𝑡𝑟𝑒𝑟∗𝑟𝑡≠𝑟 = ∑ ∑ 𝑣𝑡𝐵𝑡𝑟𝑟𝑟≠𝑟 [ (𝐴𝑟𝑟𝑥𝑟 + 𝑓𝑟𝑟)𝑟𝑡≠𝑟 + 𝑟𝑟]. (15) 
 
The VS1 index represents the domestic content of exports that are used as imported 
inputs by other countries to produce their exports; VS1 is given by 
 
𝑉𝐸1𝑟= 𝑣𝑟 ∑ 𝐵𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑟∗𝑟𝑟≠𝑟 = 𝑣𝑟 ∑ ∑ 𝐵𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑡≠ 𝑟 [ (𝐴𝑟𝑡𝑥𝑡 + 𝑓𝑟𝑡) + 𝑟𝑟𝑟𝑟≠𝑟 ].  (16) 
 
Given the characteristics of these two indices, VS and VS1 are useful to obtain insights 
for a country’s position in the vertical production networks. Because a country located in 
downstream depends heavily on imported inputs to be used for exports, it tends to have 
a high ratio of VS relative to gross exports (VS/EX). Upstream countries, in contrast, 
exports a large amount of intermediate inputs that are used by other countries to 
produce their exports, so they tend to have a high ratio of VS1 relative to gross exports 
                                                                                                                                                     
and DC of exports are used as a measure of the technology intensity of exports. The 
other reason for using DC (rather than DV) is that DC is methodologically consistent 
with the VS and VS1 indices, which do not exclude a pure double-counted portion in 
their formulas.        
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(VS1/EX).       
 
4 Results of empirical analysis 
In this section, we first look at China’s position in the regional production networks, 
with a particular focus on its linkages with Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. After that, 
China’s technology structure of exports is examined in greater detail.  
 
4.1 China’s position in the regional production networks 
Table 1 shows the result of the decomposition of gross exports for China, Japan, South 
Korea, and Taiwan. As shown in Eqs. (13) and (14), gross exports are fully decomposed 
into four elements: value added exports (VA EX), re-imports (Re_IM), Asian content 
(AC), and imports from the ROW (IM_ROW). The table shows that China’s gross exports 
continued to increase very rapidly, so that China’s exports (885 billion USD) surpassed 
those of Japan (652 billion USD) in 2005. South Korea and Taiwan also increased their 
gross exports sharply, and their gross exports became close to half of Japan’s in 2005. 
Figure 1 shows the decomposition of gross exports by percentage share. The shares of 
value added exports continued to fall in all four countries, while those of Asian content 
moved in the opposite direction. The increase in the share of Asian content obviously 
reflects deepening economic integration in East Asia, which has been accelerated by 
industry linkages spread across borders in the region. In particular, following Taiwan 
and South Korea, China sharply increased its Asian content and imports from the ROW 
in the subsequent periods. As a result, China’s share of value added exports became 
significantly lower than that of Japan in 2005; this finding appears even more 
remarkable when taking into account the relative populations of China and Japan. 
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The other important finding is that the shares of re-imports were generally low, 
except in Japan. This is because Japanese firms actively invested in East Asian 
countries, particularly in China, and re-imported their intermediate and final products, 
while this type of linkage was relatively weak in other countries. 
 
[Table 1] 
[Figure 1] 
 
Figure 2 shows the relative positions of the three countries in East Asian production 
networks. As discussed in the previous section, a country located downstream tends to 
have a high VS/EX ratio, while those located upstream have high VS1/EX ratios. In 
1990, the Chinese economy was in its initial stage of regional integration, so it had a 
relatively low VS/EX ratio and VS1/EX ratio, but China has rapidly shifted downstream 
in the subsequent period, as reflected by a rising VS/EX ratio; this implies that China 
has increased dependency on intermediate inputs provided by neighboring East Asian 
economies. Japan, in contrast, was located upstream, and has been moving further 
upstream during the observed period. South Korea and Taiwan were initially located 
downstream, but they have rapidly moved upstream8. This parallels the shift in Japan 
and occurred due to a sharp increase in their intermediate exports to China.9 In sum, 
specializations of East Asian economies have been changed in a systematic manner, as 
reflected in Figure 3. 
                                                   
8 Since South Korea and Taiwan have both a high VS1/EX ratio and a high VS/EX ratio, 
it can be said that they are located midstream in the regional production networks.  
9 The share of China’s VS attributable to South Korea (which is calculated by Eq. (15)) 
increased sharply, from 4% to 19% during 1990–2005, while that attributable to Taiwan 
increased slightly, from 10% to 11%. The share attributable to Japan, in contrast, 
decreased, from 41% to 36%. 
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[Figure2] 
[Figure 3] 
 
  
4.2 Technology structure of China’s exports  
Table 2 shows the percentage shares of exports by technological level. The technological 
classification of exports is as given in Lall (2000), and all the original industry 
classifications in the AIO tables were converted into Lall’s classification scheme.10 As 
discussed in Section 2, the export structure of China continued to be upgraded, and the 
share of the high-technology manufactures in China’s gross exports in 2005 (29.5%) 
finally exceeded that of Japan (19.5%). However, when measured by value added 
exports (respectively, DC of exports), the structure changes drastically: the share of the 
high-technology manufactures drops to 9.8% (resp., 9.9%) in 2005. Likewise, when 
measured by value added exports (resp., DC of exports), the share of high-technology 
manufactures declines substantially in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan, but the 
decline in China is much sharper than in the others. Obviously, this reflects China’s 
heavy dependence on imported inputs, particularly in high-technology manufactures. 
These facts suggest the possibility of significant overestimation of China’s 
technological intensity of exports. Furthermore, it is seen that 90% of China’s 
                                                   
10 Lall (2000) developed his original method of categorizing products by technology. The 
major categories of products are (i) high-technology manufactures (electronics and 
electrical products, and other high technology); (ii) medium-technology manufactures 
(automotive products, medium technology process industries, and medium technology 
engineering industries); (iii) low-technology manufactures (the textile/fashion cluster, 
and other low technology products); (iv) primary products; (v) resource-based 
manufactures (agriculture and forestry-based products, and other resource-based 
products). 
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high-technology exports in 2005 come from the electronics and electrical sector. This 
implies that the electronics and electrical sector is a major source of the 
overestimation.11 It should, however, be noted that despite a serious concern over the 
overestimation, China’s technological intensity of exports in terms of value added 
exports has increased considerably, from 4.9% to 9.8% during 1990–2005. This reflects 
the effects of China’s substantial efforts at technological upgrading. 
 
[Table 2] 
 
Table 3 documents the decomposition of China’s exports by technological level, where 
China’s high-technology exports are decomposed into three elements: domestic content 
(DC), Asian content (AC), and imports from the ROW (IM_ROW). AC is further 
decomposed into elements either by country of origin (in the second section) or by sector 
of origin (in the third section). The fourth section gives the 10 highest country–industry 
combinations of value added content that are embodied in China’s exports. Figure 4 
shows the decomposition of China’s exports by percentage share. 
Table 3 indicates that China’s high technology exports increased very sharply, from 7 
billion USD to 261 billion USD, during 1990–2005. However, Figure 4 demonstrates 
that the share of the DC in all types of exports continued to decline over that period. 
                                                   
11 Note that the electronics and electrical sector has the most advanced and extensive 
production networks in East Asia. In particular, China plays a central role as an 
assembly base in the formation of a triangular trade structure (Haddad, 2007; Kuroiwa 
and Kuwamori, 2011). Thus, it is natural that the electric and electrical sector in China 
contains a large amount of import content (i.e., Asian content as well as imports from 
the ROW). See also the argument by Srholec (2007) in Section 2.3 of this paper: Srholec 
argues that high-technology exports, which comprise mostly electronics exports, can 
represent a mere reflection of high-technology component imports, particularly those of 
electronics components. 
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Also, it should be noted that high-technology exports contain less DC than medium- and 
low-technology exports do (here, 61%, 73%, and 76%, respectively, in 2005). In contrast, 
the dependency on import content (i.e., Asian content as well as imports from the ROW) 
continued to increase during 1990–2005; the Asian content of the high-technology 
exports, for example, increased from 7% to 16% in this period, during which Japan was 
the largest supplier of value added embodied in China’s high-technology exports. 
Neighboring economies, and especially South Korea, have increased their shares 
rapidly. 
  
[Table3] 
[Figure 4] 
 
The third section (of Table 3) demonstrates that services have been the largest supplier 
of value added content for China’s high-technology exports, followed by high-technology 
manufactures. A similar structure can be observed for medium- and low-technology 
exports, although the next largest suppliers were, respectively, medium- and 
low-technology manufacturers. 
The fourth section clearly indicates that Japanese manufacturers and services 
comprised important value added content of China’s exports. In particular, China’s 
high-technology exports require substantial amounts of Japanese services and 
high-technology manufactures (value added) content. It is important to note that in 
1990, US industries were the second most important suppliers of value added content. 
In the subsequent period, however, South Korean and Taiwanese industries came to 
play a more significant role, so that their value added has been increasingly embodied 
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in China’s exports. 
 
5 Conclusion 
This study focused on the technological intensity of China’s exports. It first introduced a 
method of decomposing gross exports by using the Asian international input–output 
tables. The empirical results indicated that the shares of value added exports in gross 
exports have continued to decline, while those of Asian value added content have risen 
in China and neighboring economies. As a result, the production networks involving 
China and its neighbors have been strengthened during the observed period.  
Countries were placed in different positions in the regional production networks 
according to their stages of industrial development. In East Asia, China has rapidly 
moved downstream in the network. This implies that China has become increasingly 
dependent on its upstream economies, such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan for the 
procurement of the intermediate inputs used for high-technology exports. 
The analysis of value added exports indicates that China’s technological intensity of 
exports has been significantly overestimated due to its high dependency on import 
content, especially in high-technology exports. Further, a large portion of value added 
embodied in China’s high-technology exports comes from relevant industries in 
neighboring economies. In particular, the Japanese services and high-technology 
manufactured good sectors are major suppliers of value added content. In a similar vein, 
South Korea and Taiwan have moved upward in the regional production networks and 
have overtaken the United States as a major supplier of value added contained in 
China’s high-technology exports. 
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Figure 1 Decomposition of gross exports (percentage share) 
 
Source: Asian International Input–Output Tables, 1990, 2000, and 2005 (IDE-JETRO)  
 
 
 
Figure 2 VS/EX and VS1/EX  
 
Source: Asian International Input–Output Tables, 1990, 2000, and 2005 (IDE-JETRO)  
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Figure 3 Changes in specializations of East Asian economies 
 
Source: Asian International Input–Output Tables, 1990, 2000, and 2005 (IDE-JETRO)  
 
 
 
Figure 4 Decomposition of China's exports by technological level (percentage share) 
 Source: Asian International Input-Output Tables, 1990, 2000, and 2005 (IDE-JETRO) 
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Table 1 Decomposition of gross exports (millions of USD) 
 
 
 
 
 
1) EX: exports; VA EX: value added exports; Re-IM: re-imports; AC: Asian content; 
IM_ROW: imports from the Rest of the World.  
Source: Asian International Input–Output Tables, 1990, 2000, and 2005 (IDE-JETRO) 
 
 
 
  
1990 EX VA EX Re_IM AC IM_ROW
China 68,315 59,353 60 2,616 6,286
Japan 329,934 297,174 2,665 9,884 20,211
Korea 73,063 53,637 102 9,164 10,161
Taiwan 76,221 50,114 92 12,254 13,760
2000 EX VA EX Re_IM AC IM_ROW
China 300,525 236,655 1,260 24,107 38,503
Japan 530,626 470,150 8,228 19,394 32,855
Korea 205,027 138,688 652 28,972 36,716
Taiwan 176,161 105,404 601 37,207 32,949
2005 EX VA EX Re_IM AC IM_ROW
China 884,579 641,001 8,004 85,210 150,364
Japan 651,599 551,795 10,429 34,273 55,102
Korea 312,482 202,127 1,366 49,472 59,516
Taiwan 228,681 129,726 840 50,654 47,461
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Table2 Distribution of exports by technological level (percentage share) 
 
 
 
 
 
1) Technological classification is based on Lall (2000). 
Source: Asian International Input–Output Tables, 1990, 2000, and 2005 (IDE-JETRO) 
 
  
1990
EX VA EX DC EX VA EX DC EX VA EX DC EX VA EX DC
High Tech* 11.9 4.9 4.9 25.1 14.5 14.5 19.6 10.2 10.2 22.2 9.3 9.3
Medium Tech 11.0 12.8 12.8 37.3 25.8 25.7 13.9 14.1 14.1 20.3 18.8 18.8
Low Tech 26.2 15.7 15.7 8.3 9.2 9.3 24.0 15.5 15.5 20.0 14.8 14.8
Primary products 11.6 29.0 29.0 0.2 1.6 1.6 1.5 6.8 6.8 1.2 4.2 4.2
Resource based 37.5 24.8 24.8 11.8 12.7 12.7 22.6 18.4 18.4 24.2 18.6 18.6
Service 1.8 12.7 12.7 17.4 36.3 36.2 18.4 35.0 35.0 12.1 34.2 34.2
TaiwanChina Japan Korea
2000
EX VA EX DC EX VA EX DC EX VA EX DC EX VA EX DC
High Tech* 18.3 8.6 8.6 25.3 14.2 14.4 29.4 14.6 14.7 39.5 15.7 15.8
Medium Tech 20.1 15.7 15.7 44.3 26.8 26.7 26.4 18.4 18.4 21.1 14.6 14.6
Low Tech 34.4 21.6 21.6 7.7 9.5 9.6 16.9 14.3 14.3 19.0 13.6 13.6
Primary products 3.2 15.8 15.8 0.2 1.0 1.0 0.4 3.5 3.5 0.3 2.0 2.0
Resource based 9.9 10.8 10.8 3.2 5.0 5.0 8.4 8.9 8.9 4.6 5.3 5.3
Service 14 27.4 27.4 19.4 43.3 43.2 18.6 40.4 40.3 15.5 48.7 48.7
TaiwanChina Japan Korea
2005
EX VA EX DC EX VA EX DC EX VA EX DC EX VA EX DC
High Tech* 29.5 9.8 9.9 19.5 10.5 10.6 31.0 15.3 15.3 42.5 21.8 21.9
Medium Tech 19.3 15.1 15.1 45.3 25.3 25.2 34.6 22.1 22.0 20.6 12.7 12.7
Low Tech 25.8 18.6 18.6 8.2 10.0 10.1 12.5 13.4 13.4 14.1 10.7 10.7
Primary products 2.0 14.3 14.3 0.1 0.9 0.9 0.2 2.6 2.6 0.8 2.0 2.0
Resource based 9.3 10.3 10.3 3.6 5.0 5.0 8.0 8.8 8.8 5.4 6.3 6.3
Service 14.1 31.8 31.8 23.2 48.3 48.2 13.7 37.9 37.9 16.7 46.5 46.5
TaiwanChina Japan Korea
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Table 3 Decomposition of China's exports by technological level (millions of USD) 
 
 
 
1990 High Medium Low
Exports 7,289 8,434 22,343
DC 5,456 7,206 19,085
AC 527 440 866
Japan 321 197 337
Korea 34 15 47
Taiwan 39 38 112
SEA 26 43 85
USA 106 147 286
High (H) 137 12 13
Medium (M) 99 167 200
Low (L) 62 67 201
Primary (P) 21 27 100
Resource (R) 54 43 103
Service (S) 154 123 250
J-S 97 J-M 70 J-L 124
J-H 88 U-M 61 U-S 99
J-M 56 J-S 55 J-S 97
J-L 44 U-S 48 J-M 69
U-S 34 J-L 45 U-M 63
J-R 32 T-M 18 U-P 62
U-H 25 J-R 17 T-M 39
U-M 24 U-R 13 J-R 35
K-H 12 U-P 12 U-L 30
T-M 11 U-L 11 U-R 29
IM_ROW 1,306 788 2,392
2000 High Medium Low
Exports 54,951 60,325 103,486
DC 36,237 47,389 83,180
AC 7,814 5,040 7,666
Japan 2620 1985 2796
Korea 1217 892 1615
Taiwan 1237 818 1462
SEA 1090 468 701
USA 1650 878 1093
High (H) 2,780 330 365
Medium (M) 1,009 1,443 1,336
Low (L) 579 829 2,129
Primary (P) 188 203 381
Resource (R) 385 359 612
Service (S) 2,873 1,877 2,843
J-S 986 J-S 755 J-S 1,095
J-H 767 J-M 628 J-L 833
U-S 650 T-S 367 T-S 651
U-H 641 U-S 355 K-L 591
T-S 525 J-L 354 J-M 535
K-H 480 K-M 262 K-S 461
J-M 451 K-S 257 U-S 442
T-H 413 U-M 255 T-L 439
K-S 351 T-M 210 K-M 277
J-L 247 K-L 190 T-M 226
IM_ROW 10,901 7,896 12,640
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1) Technological classification is based on Lall (2000). 
2) It holds that Exports=DC+AC+IM_ROW for all the columns in the first and fifth 
sections of the Table. In the second section, AC is decomposed into five countries or 
regions (where SEA represents the five Southeast Asian countries that are covered 
in the AIO tables). In the third section, AC is decomposed into six sectors: 
high-technology manufactures (H); medium-technology manufactures (M); 
low-technology manufactures (L); primary products (P); resource-based industry (R); 
and services industry (S). The fourth section lists the top 10 combinations of country 
and industry, in terms of value-added content: J–S, for example, represents the 
services industry (S) of Japan (J), which provided the largest value added embodied 
in China’s high-technology exports for 1990, 2000, and 2005. Regarding the country 
codes, J, K, T, U, and M respectively stand for Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the 
United States, and Malaysia.  
Source: Asian International Input–Output Tables, 1990, 2000, and 2005 (IDE-JETRO) 
 
2005 High Medium Low
Exports 261,327 171,059 227,958
DC 159,404 125,126 173,471
AC 41,667 16,338 17,015
Japan 14,762 5,986 6,651
Korea 8,060 3,303 3,381
Taiwan 4,042 1,871 2,417
SEA 7,927 2,211 1,910
USA 6,877 2,967 2,657
High (H) 14,787 1,241 948
Medium (M) 4,254 4,538 2,344
Low (L) 2,824 2,053 4,622
Primary (P) 1,078 786 846
Resource (R) 1,688 929 1,053
Service (S) 17,035 6,791 7,203
J-S 6,637 J-S 2,749 J-S 3,002
J-H 4,130 J-M 1,679 J-L 1,923
K-H 3,444 U-S 1,339 K-L 1,268
U-S 3,208 K-S 1,177 U-S 1,252
K-S 2,648 K-M 953 T-S 1,232
U-H 2,307 U-M 933 K-S 1,137
J-M 1,966 J-L 866 J-M 1,007
T-H 1,640 T-S 848 T-L 642
T-S 1,608 K-L 553 U-L 523
M-S 1,406 T-M 489 K-M 446
IM_ROW 60,256 29,595 37,472
